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Essay
Constitutional Chronometry, Legal Continuity,
Stability and the Rule of Law: A Canadian Perspective
on Aspects of Richard Kay’s Scholarship
WARREN J. NEWMAN
The United States and Canada have many common traits, including a
constitutional heritage originally derived in part from British common law and
statute, a written constitution declared to be supreme law, a federal and local state
(or provincial) division of legislative powers, an entrenched bill of rights, written
procedures for constitutional amendment, and constitutional judicial review.
However, while the United States has a presidential and congressional system of
government, Canada is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system of
responsible government. Moreover, unlike the United States, Canada achieved its
independence from the United Kingdom gradually and incrementally, within the
existing legal and constitutional framework. The corollary to this evolution is that
there is no predominant revolutionary tradition or discourse in Canadian
constitutional discourse or jurisprudence. Canadian legal and political culture
places great value on the maintenance of legal continuity and stability, and in
adhering to prescribed forms and processes of law-making.
Professor Richard Kay’s scholarship has long explored the nature and
essence of American constitutionalism and the importance, in that tradition, of its
commitment to a written document. And in his master work, The Glorious
Revolution and the Continuity of Law, he examined the fraught and tenuous
relationship between law and revolution. The following essay examines Professor
Kay’s article, “Constitutional Chronometry,” and tests some of the ideas and
assumptions therein, notably from a Canadian perspective. The essay concludes
that revolutionary breaks with existing constitutional and legal orders are not the
inevitable outcomes of anachronistic constitutions, however much revolutionaries
may attempt to justify their actions ex post facto in that light. If revolutions do
occur and liberal constitutions are overthrown, it will not be because the
constitutions themselves are out of date, but because the commitment to
constitutionalism itself has been abandoned.
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Constitutional Chronometry, Legal Continuity,
Stability and the Rule of Law: A Canadian Perspective
on Aspects of Richard Kay’s Scholarship
WARREN J. NEWMAN *
PREFATORY REMARKS
I was honored and delighted to have taken part in the symposium at the
University of Connecticut dedicated to the constitutional ideas of Professor
Richard Kay. It has been a signal privilege and pleasure to know Rick Kay
and his work for more than twenty years, in both my professional capacity
as a constitutional lawyer with the Department of Justice of Canada, and in
my academic capacity as a part-time professor at several Canadian law
schools. Professor Kay’s careful and profound scholarship, and his elegant
and precise writing style, have been a constant and ready source of
inspiration. My students in comparative constitutional law have
particularly benefitted, over the years, from his masterful chapter on
American constitutionalism in Larry Alexander’s excellent collection on
the philosophical foundations of constitutionalism, published by
Cambridge University Press.1
Much of my own work and academic pursuits over the past forty years
have involved existential questions relating to constitutionalism and the
rule of law, legal stability and continuity, and constitutional change. In
1985 in the Manitoba Language Rights Reference, the Supreme Court of
Canada struck down as invalid 90 years of laws enacted by the Legislature
of the Canadian province of Manitoba, for want of compliance with a
constitutional manner-and-form requirement going to the enactment of
legislation.2 In the Quebec Secession Reference in 1998, the Supreme
Court had to determine whether the law of the Constitution of Canada
*
B.A., B.C.L., LL.B. (McGill), LL.M. (Osgoode), Ph.D. (Queen’s), Ad. E.; Senior General
Counsel, Constitutional, Administrative and International Law Section, Department of Justice of
Canada. This Paper is offered purely in this author’s academic capacity and the views expressed herein
do not bind the Department or the Government of Canada.
1
Richard S. Kay, American Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS 16–50 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998).
2
Reference re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, 746 (Can.). On the reference
mechanism in Canada, see Warren J. Newman, Standing to Raise Constitutional Issues in Canada, in
STANDING TO RAISE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 203–07 (Richard S. Kay
ed., 2005); CARISSIMA MATHEN, COURTS WITHOUT CASES: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF ADVISORY
OPINIONS 45–47, 58–59 (2019).
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applied to the secession of the province of Quebec from Canada, such that
for secession to be lawful, a constitutional amendment would be required.3
More recently, in the Senate Reform Reference, the Court had to determine
whether proposed legislative measures to alter aspects of the upper house
of the Parliament of Canada were in fact constitutional amendments going
to the fundamental features and institutional design of the Senate, and thus
subject to the Constitution’s complex and stringent multilateral
procedures.4
I appeared before the Supreme Court as one of counsel in each of these
references. It should come as no surprise, then, that Richard Kay’s writings
have often been much on my mind when it comes to the theory and
practice of constitutional law in Canada, and the elucidation of ideas and
principles associated with constitutionalism and the rule of law in liberal
democratic federations like ours.
I. CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES: POINTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE
The constitutional frameworks and legal systems of Canada and the
United States share much in their design and traditions. We both have a
British common-law constitutional heritage that we like to trace back
romantically to the English Bill of Rights of 1689 or indeed, the Magna
Carta of 1215. We each possess a written document—or in in the
Canadian case, a compendious list of Acts and instruments—declared by
the Constitution itself to be the “supreme law” of the land, with a federal
division of legislative powers between central and local legislatures, an
entrenched bill of rights, and express legal procedures for constitutional
amendment. Americans have Article V of the Constitution of the United
States; Canadians have Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982. The Acts of
Congress and Parliament and of state and provincial legislatures are,
generally speaking, subject to constitutional judicial review; the doctrine of
the separation of executive, legislative, and judicial powers (still, in some
ways, an emerging doctrine in Canada) is also always in play. Moreover,
generally speaking, with controversial and debatable exceptions, we share
an abiding commitment to judicial independence and the rule of law. These
are some, but by no means all, of the features common to our two
constitutions.
However, our countries are also constitutionally distinct in other
important respects. Unlike the United States, which is a republic with a
presidential and congressional system of government, Canada is a
constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system of representative and
3
4

Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 218 (Can.).
Reference re Senate Reform, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 704, 709–10.
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responsible government. Moreover, although the Dominion of Canada
established in 1867 in what was then known as British North America has
become as much a sovereign and independent state as the great republic
whose independence was declared in 1776, Canada achieved its
independence incrementally over a comparatively long period. This
independence was legally accomplished through the Statute of
Westminster, 1931 and the Canada Act 1982, statutes enacted originally by
the United Kingdom Parliament, but which are now part of the law of the
Constitution of Canada in a domestic and internal sense.5
II. NO PREDOMINANT REVOLUTIONARY TRADITION IN CANADIAN
CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE OR JURISPRUDENCE
A corollary to this is that Canada has had no revolutionary act or
moment at the core of its founding, and thus no strong revolutionary
tradition or predominant current in its constitutional discourse and legal
theory. It is a truism oft repeated that Canadians and Canadian political
institutions favor, in the main, evolution over revolution. American
constitutional thinkers, on the other hand, have had to explain the
Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, and
ultimately, the establishment of the Constitution of the United States in
ways which plausibly and coherently account for the break with the old
legal order and which celebrate the undoubted virtues of new beginnings
and new constitutional moments.
Many American scholars perhaps naturally tend to see legal (and
illegal) revolutions occurring where most of their Canadian counterparts
will only want to sustain, where possible, legal stability and continuity.
This is probably, of course, a gross generalization, but it is put this way to
make an important point. Canadian constitutionalism, particularly legal
constitutionalism, abhors revolution as a means by which to achieve
fundamental political change. This is not to deny the existence or current
legitimacy of many states that have achieved their sovereignty through
unilateral declarations of independence and similar forms of regime change
resulting in legal discontinuity, but it is to affirm that this has not been the
Canadian tradition.
Constitutional Law Professor Emeritus Stephen Scott of McGill
University, in his written brief to the Supreme Court in the aforementioned
Manitoba Language Rights Reference, put it eloquently in dealing with the
potential resort, in that instance, to doctrines such as state necessity and the
resort to de facto authority (notably as invoked in some of the American
civil war cases):
5
Statute of Westminster, 1931, 22 Geo. V c. 4 (UK); Canada Act 1982, c. 11 (UK), reprinted in
R.S.C. 1985 (Can.); Constitution Act, 1867, c. 3 (UK), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985 (Can.).
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Anglo-Canadian public law is deeply legitimist—which is
another way of saying, deeply committed to
constitutionalism. Law must be made according to law—and
not otherwise . . . .
Doctrines of state necessity, public convenience, and de facto
authority are means of escape from the discipline of the
principles of legality. They are confessions of the failure of
the legal system, not marks of its success . . . . They carry
temptations for the political authorities, and correlative
dangers for the legal system and the rule of law. They must
not be the first resort, but the last; and then only to the extent
strictly necessary.6
Professor Scott continued inexorably in his argument towards a
broader, but equally profound, observation:
Nor should every substantial illegality be excused on the
basis that a revolution has occurred, and a legal order
commenced, whereunder the Court is acting. Rather the
Courts must maintain the continuity of the legal order from
the earliest possible date. Every fundamental legal
discontinuity—every new revolutionary commencement—
represents a successful and profound attack on
constitutionalism itself, and a trauma for the legal system.7
In the Manitoba Language Rights Reference, the Supreme Court did
not shrink from the consequences of its decision to invalidate ninety years
of Manitoba laws for want of compliance with the manner-and-form
requirements of law-making prescribed by the Constitution of Canada.8
The unconstitutional statutes were declared to be “of no force or effect”
pursuant to section 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870 and the supremacy clause
in section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.9 That declaration was
consistent with the principles of constitutionalism and the rule of law.
However, “because of the Manitoba Legislature’s persistent violation of
the constitutional dictates of the Manitoba Act, 1870,” the Province of
Manitoba was, the Court also recognized, “in a state of emergency.”10 The
Court canvassed analogous cases on state necessity but was careful to
further the application of the principle of the rule of law in deeming
6

Stephen A. Scott, factum filed on behalf of Alliance Québec, in the Supreme Court of Canada,
on May 25, 1984, in Reference re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721 (emphasis in
original paras. 48, 57) (parenthetical numbering of points internal to para. 57 removed).
7
Id. para. 61.
8
Reference re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. at 723.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 766.
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Manitoba laws valid and effective for the “minimum period of time
necessary for translation, re-enactment, printing and publishing of these
laws.”11
In the Quebec Secession Reference, the Supreme Court noted that the
Constitution Act, 1867’s mention, in its preamble, of Canada having “a
Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom” had
emphasized “the continuity of constitutional principles, including
democratic institutions and the rule of law; and the continuity of the
exercise of sovereign power transferred from Westminster to the federal
and provincial capitals of Canada.”12 The Court went on to observe that
“Canada’s evolution from colony to fully independent state was gradual”
and that “Canada’s independence from Britain was achieved through legal
and political evolution with an adherence to the rule of law and stability.”13
The Statute of Westminster, 1931, had “confirmed in law what had earlier
been confirmed in fact by the Balfour Declaration of 1926, namely, that
Canada was an independent country.”14 The proclamation of the
Constitution Act, 1982 had “removed the last vestige of British authority
over the Canadian Constitution”:
Legal continuity, which requires an orderly transfer of
authority, necessitated that the 1982 amendments be made by
the Westminster Parliament, but the legitimacy as
distinguished from the formal legality of the amendments
derived from political decisions taken in Canada within a
legal framework which this Court, in the Patriation
Reference, had ruled was in accordance with our
Constitution.15
In the Secession Reference, the Supreme Court refused to entertain
arguments proffered by certain academics at the time that the secession of
a province of Canada would be beyond the contemplation of the existing
constitutional order and thus would be an entirely political and extralegal,
or supraconstitutional, phenomenon. Rather, the Court held that although
the Constitution’s amending procedures were silent on the subject of
secession, that did not mean that the legal aspects of secession were
beyond their reach.16 “Secession,” the Court stated, “is a legal act as much
11

Id. at 768.
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 245, para. 44 (Can.).
13
Id. at 246, para. 46.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 246–47, paras. 46–48 (“We think it apparent from even this brief historical review that
the evolution of our constitutional arrangements has been characterized by adherence to the rule of law,
respect for democratic institutions, the accommodation of minorities, insistence that governments
adhere to constitutional conduct and a desire for continuity and stability.”).
16
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. at 235.
12
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as a political one,” and “the legality of unilateral secession must be
evaluated, at least in the first instance, from the perspective of the domestic
legal order of the state from which the unit seeks to withdraw.”17 “The
secession of a province from Canada,” the Court held, “must be
considered, in legal terms, to require an amendment to the Constitution,”
because “an act of secession would purport to alter the governance of
Canadian territory in a manner which undoubtedly is inconsistent with our
current constitutional arrangements.”18 The fact that the changes would be
“profound,” and potentially “radical and extensive,” did “not negate their
nature as amendments to the Constitution of Canada.”19
The Supreme Court also rejected the idea of a constitutional principle
of effectivity, akin to the doctrine of necessity, which had been urged upon
it by the amicus curiae in the Reference.
In our view, the alleged principle of effectivity has no
constitutional or legal status in the sense that it does not
provide an ex ante explanation or justification for an act. In
essence, acceptance of a principle of effectivity would be
tantamount to accepting that the National Assembly,
legislature or government of Quebec may act without regard
to the law, simply because it asserts the power to do so. So
viewed, the suggestion is that the National Assembly,
legislature or government of Quebec could purport to secede
the province unilaterally from Canada in disregard of
Canadian and international law. It is further suggested that if
the secession bid was successful, a new legal order would be
created in that province, which would then be considered an
independent state.
Such a proposition is an assertion of fact, not a statement of
law. It may or may not be true; in any event, it is irrelevant to
the questions of law before us. If, on the other hand, it is put
forward as an assertion of law, then it simply amounts to the
contention that the law may be broken as long as it can be
broken successfully. Such a notion is contrary to the rule of
law and must be rejected.20
17

Id. at 263, para. 83.
Id. para. 84.
19
Id. at 263–64, para. 84. For further discussion, see generally WARREN J. NEWMAN, THE
QUEBEC SECESSION REFERENCE, THE RULE OF LAW AND THE POSITION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF CANADA (1999); Richard S. Kay, The Secession Reference and the Limits of Law, 10 OTAGO L.
REV. 327, 327 (2003) (characterizing the opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Secession
Reference); Stéphane Dion, Secession and the Virtues of Clarity, 44 OTTAWA L. REV. 403, 405 (2012)
(arguing the universality of the opinion on secession).
20
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. at 275, paras. 107–108.
18
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The idea that Canada’s procedures for constitutional amendment might
contemplate the possibility of, and contain the means for, effecting the
secession of a province from the Canadian federal state lawfully, through
legal and properly enacted alterations to the Constitution of Canada itself,
served as a way of channeling the political forces that were militating in
favor of such radical changes through a constitutional framework and
parameters. While ruling that a unilateral declaration of independence
would be unlawful, the Supreme Court of Canada’s opinion in the
Secession Reference carefully balanced considerations of legality and
legitimacy, legal and political constitutionalism, democracy and the rule of
law, and federalism and the protection of minorities21 in a way that made
the lawful processes of the Constitution attractive to Canadian federalists
and Quebec sovereigntists alike, insofar as both would have a stake in the
proper workings of the Constitution and in principled discussions aimed at
accomplishing constitutionally achievable ends. This may be contrasted in
some measure with the American experience of the Civil War, the
Confederacy of secessionist states, and the judgment of the Supreme Court
of the United States in Texas v. White, in which the Court held that “[t]he
Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union,
composed of indestructible States.”22
III. RICHARD KAY’S CONSTITUTIONAL CHRONONOMY
In his thoughtful paper, Constitutional Chrononomy, Professor Richard
Kay wove together certain strands of his earlier writings on
constitutionalism but with a particular focus on the temporal ambitions of
constitution-making and the temporal limitations on constitutional
life-spans.23 There is a low-key, patient, but clear and compelling (and in
places, relentless and implacable) logic to most and perhaps all of
Professor Kay’s essays, and Constitutional Chrononomy fits well within
this pattern. The themes herein enunciated may be summarized and
paraphrased in part as follows: the singular purpose of constitution-making
is to control the future behavior of the state, by articulating, in advance,
rules of state conduct which will minimize the extent to which the state
interferes in the lives of its citizens.24 The constitution establishes (i.e.,
constitutes) institutions and sets out the procedures that must be followed
to effect genuine and authentic (or authoritative) acts of government.25 The
constitution also prohibits certain activities by government, and

21

See id. paras. 76–77 (discussing these balanced considerations).
Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725 (1868).
23
See generally Richard S. Kay, Constitutional Chrononomy, 13 RATIO JURIS. 31 (2000).
24
Id. at 31.
25
Id.
22
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occasionally, sets forth affirmative duties on government. These aim,
through scriptural injunctions (“thou shalt” and “thou shalt not”), to
confirm power within acceptable limits by requiring decisions to be taken
with the concurrence of diverse interests.27 The sanction for not respecting
the constitutional processes specified, or acting in conflict with the
constitutional protections afforded or the stipulations prescribed, is that
non-compliant government acts are generally treated as ineffective (or in
the terms of section 52 of Canada’s Constitution Act, 1982, “of no force or
effect”).28 Like that of all rules, the enactment of constitutional rules
“supposes that future actors will understand them and heed them. Their
success thus depends on an attitude that, by definition, respects the act of
constitution-making, a particular historical event.”29
There is, Professor Kay observed, “a chrononomic aspect to every
constitution” that “marks out not merely a social, geographic and political
space but also a limited interval in time.”30 The “linkage between
constitutionalism and the passage of time” is threefold: (i)
“constitution-making requires an acute awareness of the inevitably
unpredictable course of future events”; (ii) “constitutional interpretation
and application demands attention to that historical act of
constitution-making”; and (iii) “the act of resisting and finally terminating
the authority of a given constitution will involve a comparison between
past beliefs, plans and aspirations embodied in the relevant constitution
and those of the new society which it purports to govern.”31 The balance of
his paper is devoted to these three features: “Looking Forward,” “Looking
Back,” and “Temporal Dysfunction.”32
In terms of looking ahead, Professor Kay’s leitmotif, so elegantly
developed in his earlier essay, American Constitutionalism,33 is that “[t]he
central social function of constitutions is the prevention of a proven
danger—overreaching by the state.”34 Legal rules of institutional design,
procedure, and substance are the machinery by which the exercise of the
state’s powers are confined within predetermined and set limits, in keeping
with the liberal view that “human thriving is most likely to be obtained in a
life that is largely self-defined,”35 and that at least a minimum core of a
priori rules that bind the state, either procedurally or in substance, allow
26

Id. at 32.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
28
Constitution Act, 1982, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, app. II, no. 44, § 52(1) (Can.).
29
Kay, supra note 23, at 32.
30
Id.
31
Id. (emphasis added).
32
Id. at 33, 37, 41.
33
Kay, supra note 1.
34
Kay, supra note 23, at 33.
35
Id.
27
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for individual planning and personal autonomy in a private sphere or space
that is reasonably secure from unwarranted, unannounced, and capricious
intrusions by the state. On this basis, “constitutional rules must be
relatively long lived” if constitutional protections are to be effective in
making “individual planning possible.”36 Without the specification of “a
more or less permanent set of rules of state conduct,” the “central feature
of constitutionalism”—the ability “to predict what the state will and will
not do in relation to the projected conduct of individuals”—will be
“subverted if the constitution undergoes repeated changes”: “there is an
intrinsic incompatibility between constitutions and continuous
constitutional revision.”37
Professor Kay recognized, of course, that most constitution-makers,
while motivated with the intention that the supreme rules they are drafting
will likely operate well into an indefinite future, will also understand that a
constitution, as a human and therefore perfectible instrument, cannot be
entirely immutable, and thus will also make some provision for
constitutional amendment.38 That amendment procedure will, however, (if
properly designed) “take into account the need for long-term stability” and
thus “make the successful adoption of amendments difficult.”39
Constitutional drafters therefore “work on the assumption that the rules
they establish will remain in place relatively unchanged for a long period
of time,” that “frequent amendment cannot be expected” (nor would it be a
good thing); and that “the world in which those rules will be applied will
not stand still.”40 This desire for longevity in a changing world commends
a prudential approach that narrows the range of matters subject to
constitutional control, and avoids strictly defining or hedging in
governmental powers “with limits so specific” as to disable effective
government.41 Moreover, “[t]he promulgation of a constitution, being an
event both important and infrequent, is generally thought to require an
extraordinarily broad political consensus in order to invest it with that
legitimacy which will allow it to function effectively over the long term.”42
This long-term desideratum and the need for consensus will “move the
constitution-makers to limit themselves” to imposing only those limitations
and protections that are “believed essential for future safety.”43
In terms of looking back, if constitution-makers must “speculate about
the future” in which their provisions will be applied, then it follows, in
36

Id.
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 34.
41
Id. at 35.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 35–36.
37
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Professor Kay’s view, that those who are subsequently subject to the
constitution must look back to glean the framers’ intentions “in order to
understand the content of constitutional limitations.”44 In this part of his
paper, Professor Kay covered well-trodden ground, eschewing the
living-tree approach (predominant in Canada)45 to constitutional
interpretation as “in tension with a central aspect of the enterprise of
constitutionalism.”46 Constitutions are designed to restrict state action by
setting out “structures, procedures and substantive rules” with a view
toward applying them into the future: “[t]his exercise is nothing if not a
judgment that the constituent decisions” embodied in the supreme law of
the constitution “are to be preferred to the subsequent official decisions”
(particularly, one might add, when the latter are in conflict with the
former).47 A constitution that is always being adapted through judicial
interpretation to deal with current problems and needs is, in Professor
Kay’s stark assessment, “no constitution at all.”48
Professor Kay was only slightly more sanguine about the textualist
approach to constitutional interpretation, insofar as it “defines somewhat
stricter limits for interpretation than the more general ‘living constitution’
model. The words of the constitution themselves restrict the number of
possible interpretations by limiting them to those consistent with the
standard definitions of the words of the textual provision invoked.”49
However, the textualist approach, being “another attempt to extirpate
historical references from the process of constitutional application,” carries
its own share of issues, including “problems that are especially
troublesome for the idea of a constitution as an a priori and relatively
stable set of rules for public action.”50 To the extent that textualism permits
the possibility of more than one meaning of the constitutional text, it
renders the constitution’s meaning “intrinsically uncertain,” which limits
its capacity to draw with assurance the limits of state intrusion and “the
boundaries of undisturbed private conduct.”51 As well, in Professor Kay’s
view, “the refusal to inquire into the specific meaning attached to a
constitutional rule by its enactors undercuts the claim of the constitution to
be regarded as authoritative.”52 The normative force of constitutions is at
44

Id. at 37.
Warren J. Newman, Of Castles and Living Trees: The Metaphorical and Structural
Constitution, 9 J. PARLIAMENTARY & POL. L. 471, 471–97 (2015) (exploring some competing
structural and animating metaphors of constitutionalism).
46
Kay, supra note 23, at 38.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 38–39.
52
Id. at 39.
45
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least in part made possible by “appeals to the solemn decision of ‘the
people’ in creating them,” such that the constitution’s legitimacy cannot be
“divorced from its historical origins,” and the idea that “it is the product of
some shared purpose amongst a group of people” who for that
constitutional moment and into the future were believed to be “the right
people to make fundamental decisions for a polity.”53
So far, this analytical discourse is unsurprising and largely
uncontroversial, for those who have read Professor Kay’s American
Constitutionalism and similar writings, and the propositions are put with
his usual elegant flair. However, it is the final part of the paper, dealing
with “Temporal Dysfunction,” which gives this Canadian constitutional
lawyer some pause; not so much in the diagnostic, but in the remedy.
Professor Kay contended that if, as discussed, “the great ambition of
constitution-makers is to bind the future to the values of the present,” then
“the great problem for this enterprise is the inability to predict with
confidence how the future will look and how human beings whose actions
are to be controlled will respond in that unpredictable time to come.”54
Techniques, both in the drafting and in the interpretation of constitutions,
have been noted to mediate the issue and mitigate its effects. Yet “sooner
or later every constitution will begin to chafe,” and it is “inevitable that
urgent needs or intolerable evils will appear that were simply
unforeseeable at the time of constitution-making.”55 The “ordering of
social values that informed the initial constitutional decisions may shift
significantly,” and there “will then develop a misalignment between the
constitution and the social and political realities” now obtaining.56
Of course, constitutional misalignment may be corrected, to some
degree, through constitutional amendment and judicial interpretation. But
in many cases, the natural tendency will be to “do nothing” and to tolerate,
to the extent possible, the increasing anomalies caused by the “lack of fit”
between the “now obsolete constitutional text” and “important social
factors” rather than “undertak[ing] the difficult and traumatic process of
full-blown constitutional replacement.”57
Professor Kay continued by noting that “[a]lthough every constitution
exhibits an increasingly poor fit with contemporary facts and values, such
constitutions will be tolerated until some issue arises the importance of
which justifies an explicit re-examination.”58 He gave the example of
Canada’s Constitution as exhibiting a significant and persistent
53

Id.
Id. at 41.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 42.
58
Id.
54
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misalignment in that, while Canada had become a sovereign state, its
formal constitutional amendment process continued to lie with the United
Kingdom Parliament.59 This occasioned only “minor inconvenience” until
1982, when the then-federal government sought to “exploit the formal but
outdated rules to effect a substantial and concrete change.”60 For Canada,
“a change in the constitutional amendment rules emerged only after the
federal government, contrary to long-standing practice, attempted to secure
a new amendment procedure and an entrenched Bill of Rights, by
requesting an act of the United Kingdom Parliament without obtaining
agreement from provincial governments.”61 However, I would add that
ultimately, constitutional change was effected legally, and in accordance
with the constitutional conventions that had developed through past
practices. There was a strain on the constitutional system, particularly with
respect to Quebec, but there was no revolutionary break with the old
order.62 As the Supreme Court of Canada observed: “The Constitution Act,
1982 is now in force. Its legality is neither challenged nor assailable.”63
Professor Kay made a good point when he observed that although
“every modern constitution provides machinery for its own amendment,” a
constitution “must provide some minimal amount of stability and
predictability,” and thus, in this respect, “the amendment procedures must
be designed to frustrate frequent change.”64 He then asked rhetorically:
“What happens when an unchanged—and practically unchangeable—
constitution becomes politically unacceptable?”65
Judicial refitting of the constitution to current need through a process
of progressive interpretation—the “living tree” approach—if it takes the
constitution beyond the “categories created by the original enactors,” must,
in Professor Kay’s view, “amount to an irregular amendment of the
constitution by its interpreters.”66 While judicial construction of this kind
“may successfully realign the constitution,” it will also be “subversive of
constitutionalism” by increasing legal uncertainty as to what the
constitutional rules are, thereby undermining the security one seeks in
59
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Id.
61
Id. at 42–43.
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It is true that the Committee on the Constitution of the Canadian Bar Association, in its report,
Towards a New Canada, published in 1978, did recommend the “dramatic gesture” of a unilateral
declaration of independence in proclaiming a new Canadian constitution; it is a testament to the
sagacity and prudence of the Canadian political leaders of the day that they emphatically chose the path
of legality, through a final enactment of the United Kingdom Parliament, instead. COMM. ON THE
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Re: Objection by Quebec to a Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 793, 806
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67

establishing a constitution. Kay gave the example of the American
Constitution as one that has been substantially changed through the course
of litigation and judicial interpretation, which has “significantly reduced . .
. the settling and securing functions of the constitution.”68
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AND REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE
However, having regard to the limitations inherent in both the formal
constitutional amendment and judicial interpretation processes, Professor
Kay posited that “[a]t some point the constitution becomes incorrigibly
unsuitable for the polity it is meant to govern. At this point the only avenue
open for dealing with the problem is an explicit departure from law the old
constitution has established.”69 This, to a Canadian jurist, is like saying
that sooner or later an asteroid will hit the earth and destroy all forms of
higher life.
Professor Kay hastened to add that “[t]his kind of constitutional
change need not be violent or even particularly disruptive. What it requires
is that there be a palpable departure from the authority of the existing
constitution.”70 A well-known illustration was the departure from the
Articles of Confederation and the enactment of the Constitution of the
United States between 1787 and 1789, which was accomplished “through
peaceful, although unauthorized, procedures.”71
Indeed, he went on to contend that there are “advantages to changing
constitutions through overtly illegal means.”72 The new constitutional and
legal order would, Kay suggested, “be able to draw legitimacy from the
events of the change.”73 That, of course, is true only if the founders of the
new order are generally perceived, I would note, as acting legitimately in
overthrowing the existing legal regime, and are not considered to be
revolutionary usurpers, acting without legal authority to impose their will
by force.
Professor Kay argued as well that “[t]he quality of the constitutional
rules created may also be compromised by failing to acknowledge the
break in legal continuity.”74 It will be harder to meet “special needs” of
constitutional lawmaking “if the process is disguised as mere
subconstitutional change.”75 A “transparently illegal action allows
67
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subsequent interpreters of the new constitutional rules to place them in the
true context of their creation.”76 Attempting to reconcile those rules with
the pre-existing constitutional authority may obscure their meaning and
thereby undermine “the constitutionalist desiderata of stability and
clarity.”77 Yet to this, I must add, as a plaintive aside, what about the
constitutionalist desiderata of maintaining the rule of law?
Professor Kay did allow that where “substantial elements in a society
[] remain committed to the prior constitutional regime . . . only a contest of
force can effect the necessary constitutional change.”78 Professor Kay
further acknowledged that “[w]hen the resistance comes from the official
holders of power, the result is a revolution. A successful revolution is the
clearest possible indication that time has made the existing constitution
unsuitable.”79
Kay then made another key observation: “It is remarkable, however,
how often genuine revolutionaries seek to connect their actions in one way
or the other to the artifacts of the legal system they are displacing,”80
pointing to the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89 in England81 and to the
declarations of the President of the unilaterally seceding states in the
Confederacy. 82
The same point could have been made with regard to the Draft Bill on
the Sovereignty of Quebec which was introduced in the National Assembly
in December 1994, and which contained within it the terms of a unilateral
declaration of independence.83 As I wrote some years ago:
What it portended was nothing less than a revolution, an
overthrow of the established legal order of Canada. But it
was a revolution that dared not speak its name. The
“Declaration of Sovereignty” was to be clothed in statutory
form, and on its face the Act would promise continuity, not
chaos. However, by an artful sleight of hand, the legislature
of the province of Quebec, which exercises its powers under
the Constitution of Canada, would be replaced by the
76
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National Assembly of the independent state of Quebec,
exercising powers under the new régime purportedly
established by the sovereignty legislation itself.84
As Professor Kay finally conceded, “The same craving for stability
that animates constitutionalism may make the appearance of some form of
legal continuity essential to generate the political acceptability even of
revolutionary change.”85
V. CONSTITUTIONAL CHRONOMETRY AND THE FUTURE REACH OF
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
All in all, the thesis mooted in Constitutional Chrononomy strikes me
(and with the greatest of respect for its author) as somewhat of an exercise
in armchair philosophy. Revolutionary breaks with existing constitutional
and legal orders are not the inevitable outcomes of anachronistic
constitutions, however much revolutionaries may attempt to justify their
actions ex post facto in that light. If revolutions do occur and liberal
constitutions are overthrown, it will not be because the constitutions
themselves are out of date, but because the commitment to
constitutionalism itself has been abandoned.
Indeed, as the tenets of modern constitutionalism continue to develop,
it appears to this Canadian participant that a convergence on basic
constitutional norms and constitutions is occurring. The importance to all
modern states of the rule of law, the separation of powers, judicial
independence, democratic and representative political institutions, free and
fair elections, the protection of minorities, and fundamental rights cannot
be gainsaid. Legal continuity is a corollary, and stability a desirable effect,
of the maintenance of the rule of law. American comparativists, such as
Richard Kay, Mark Tushnet, Vicki Jackson, Mark Graber, Bruce
Ackerman, and the late Norman Dorsen, have worked hard to ensure that
the great ideas and enterprise of constitutionalism are perpetuated, not
upended and replaced. The opening words of Professor Kay’s chapter on
“American Constitutionalism” carry this normative message forward in
clear, matter-of-fact, and eloquent terms:
As the twentieth century comes to a close, the triumph of
constitutionalism appears almost complete. Just about every
state in the world has a written constitution. The great
majority of these declare the constitution to be law
controlling the organs of the state. And, in at least many
84
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states, that constitution is, in fact, successfully invoked by
courts holding acts of the state invalid because inconsistent
with the constitution. This development is generally thought
to be a tribute to an especially American idea. Although there
is considerable variation in the substantive contents and
structural machinery of constitutionalism in various
countries, the central idea, forged in the American founding,
of public power controlled by the enforcement of a superior
law is present everywhere constitutional government is
proclaimed.86
The events of the first two decades of the twenty-first century might
suggest to some, both cynics and idealists alike, that the words above were
reflective only of hubris, and that in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and the
Americas, the ideas, tenets, and values of constitutionalism are being
threatened, rolled back, or are otherwise under siege.
That said, the normative potential and influence of the discipline of
comparative constitutional law is greater than ever before. This is due, in
the main, to the exponential availability and distribution of constitutional
texts, doctrine, and jurisprudence, through the Internet and other modes of
instantaneous electronic communication; the burgeoning initiatives of the
academy such as the I-CONnect Blog;87 the reports and opinions of
academic or expert advisory bodies such as the Bingham Centre for the
Rule of Law;88 the Constitution Unit at University College London;89 the
European Commission on Democracy through Law90 (the Venice
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Kay, supra note 1, at 16 (citations omitted).
See Tom Ginsburg, Welcome Message from Tom Ginsberg, I-CONNECT: INT’L J. CONST. L.
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2020) (“Our goals, succinctly, are several. We want a place for real-time updates on important new
constitutional cases, amendments, constitution-making efforts and other new developments. We hope
to also provide a forum for thoughtful analysis of major issues in the field of comparative constitutional
law.”).
88
See
Mission
and
Strategic
Aims,
BINGHAM
CTR.
FOR
RULE
L.,
https://binghamcentre.biicl.org/mission-strategicaims (last visited Feb. 13, 2020) (“Our mission is
simple: to advance the Rule of Law worldwide.”).
89
See About Us, CONSTITUTION UNIT UCL, https://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/aboutconstitution-unit/about-us (last visited Feb. 13, 2020) (“The Constitution Unit conducts timely,
rigorous, independent research into constitutional change and the reform of political institutions. Our
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the United Kingdom and around the world.”).
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https://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_Presentation&lang=EN (last visited Feb. 13,
2020) (“The role of the Venice Commission is to provide legal advice to its member states and, in
particular, to help states wishing to bring their legal and institutional structures into line with European
standards and international experience in the fields of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. It
also helps to ensure the dissemination and consolidation of a common constitutional heritage . . . .”).
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Commission, celebrating its 30 anniversary this year); the World
Conference on Constitutional Justice;92 the Global Network on Electoral
Justice;93 comparative documents such as the Commonwealth Principles on
the Three Branches of Government;94 the Venice Commission’s Rule of
Law Checklist;95 and more.96
We must continue to harness this theoretical and practical work, to
participate in these academic and institutional fora, to nourish and sustain
our belief and trust in constitutionalism as a means to establish a priori
limits on the exercise of state powers, to encourage public actors to stay
within those limits, and thus to guarantee us all a margin of safety,
91
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See World Conference on Constitutional Justice — 117 Members!, VENICE COMMISSION ON
COUNCIL EUR., https://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=02_WCCJ (last visited Feb. 13, 2020)
(“The World Conference on Constitutional Justice unites 117 Constitutional Courts and Councils and
Supreme Courts in Africa, the Americas, Asia, Australia/Oceania and Europe. It promotes
constitutional justice – understood as constitutional review including human rights case-law – as a key
element for democracy, the protection of human rights and the rule of law . . . .”).
93
See GLOB. NETWORK ON ELECTORAL JUSTICE, CONSTITUTIVE ACT 1,
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ON THE THREE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT 10 (2009), http://www.cpahq.org/cpahq/cpadocs/
Commonwealth%20Latimer%20Principles%20web%20version.pdf (“The objective of these Principles
is to provide, in accordance with the laws and customs of each Commonwealth country, an effective
framework for the implementation by governments, parliaments and judiciaries of the
Commonwealth’s fundamental values.”).
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autonomy, and self-realization. In doing so, we will also preserve the true
constitutional and intellectual legacy of Professor Kay.

